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the article defines and discusses the types of state aid under the Treaty Establishing the European
Community. Second, the article analyzes the distortion of competition and effect on trade that
state aids have. Third, the article discusses whether state aid qualifies for an exemption because it
fulfills some other goal of the Treaty.
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INTRODUCTION
When one considers competition law in the European Com-
munity ("Community" or "EC"), it is useful to keep in mind the
wording of Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Community ("EC Treaty" or "Treaty").' Article 2 states:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a
common market... and by implementing the common poli-
cies or activities referred to in Article[ ] 3 . . . to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced de-
velopment of economic activities, sustainable and non-infla-
tionary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of
convergence of economic performance, a high level of em-
ployment and of social protection, the raising of the standard
of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion
and solidarity among member-States.2
Article 3 states that "[f] or the purpose set out in Article 2,
the activities of the Community shall include.., a system ensur-
* Professor of Economics, Ecole Sup~rieure des Sciences Economiques et Com-
merciales ("ESSEC"); Vice-Chairman, Conseil de la Concurrence. A version of this Arti-
cle will be published in 1994 FoRDHAM CoRP. L. INsT. (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1995). Copy-
right © Transnational Publications, Inc., 1995.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/01 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) [here-
inafter TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd.
5179-11) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1
(1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TRFATiES ESTABUSHING THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNIMES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
2. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2.
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ing that competition in the internal market is not distorted."'
The first Chapter of Title V of the Treaty establishes "rules on
competition" applying to undertakings4 and to "aids granted by
States."5 The provisions on competition of the Treaty should
also be read in the context of its preamble, in which the found-
ing fathers recognized that "the removal of existing obstacles
calls for concerted action in order to guarantee steady expan-
sion, balanced trade and fair competition."6
As Helmuth R.B. Schr6ter stated a few years ago:
[T]he much broader scope of and plurality of aims pursued
by EC competition policy result in making antitrust analysis
under Community law a more complicated process than
under the antitrust law of the United States which considers
'allocative efficiency/consumer welfare' as the sole valid stan-
dard.7
These considerations have three consequences that are of
particular importance in understanding the way the EC competi-
tion law is designed or enforced, and in understanding in partic-
ular the enforcement of the provisions on state aids. The first
element to bear in mind has to do with the concept of competi-
tion, which underlies the EC Treaty. Among other things, com-
petition must be fair. As early as the 1960's, the Court ofJustice
stated that "the elimination of barriers" and "fair competition"
were both necessary to bring about a single market.8
As Schr6ter noted:
According to the Commission, 'the principle of fairness in
the market' place not only requires that equality of opportu-
nity must be preserved for all commercial operators in the
Common Market. It also highlights the need to take into ac-
count the great variety of situations in which firms carry on
business and to pay special regard to small and medium
firms. Finally, it demands that competition policy take ac-
count of the legitimate interests of workers, users and con-
sumers.
9
3. Id. art. 3.
4. Id. arts. 85-86.
5. Id. art. 92.
6. Id. pmbl.
7. Helmuth RB. Schr6ter, Antitrust Analysis Under Article 85(1) and (3), in 1987
Fom)H.m CoRP. L. INsr. 645, 661 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1988).
8. Italy v. Council, Case 32/65, [1966] E.C.R. 389, 404, [1969] C.M.L.R. 39, 60-61.
9. Schr~ter, supra note 7, at 660.
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In that sense the EC competition law not only protects the pro-
cess of competition, but also the competitors. In the area of re-
strictive agreements, the issue of fairness does not come up very
often, but one example quoted by Waelbroeck' ° is the first SABA
decision, in which the Commission stated:
The supply of goods by SABA wholesalers to private custom-
ers in Germany would ... be inappropriate in a multi-level
system such as that operated by SABA, with it$ clear definition
of function between wholesalers and retailers. SABA whole-
salers would furthermore have an unfair competitive advan-
tage over SABA retailers. This type of unfair competitive ad-
vantage would not be protected by Article 85.11
Similarly, among the abuses prohibited by Article 86 are "di-
rectly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions"12 and "applying dissimilar con-
ditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage." I3 Com-
menting on the case law, Thomas E. Kauper states:
The treatment under Article 86 of refusals to deal by domi-
nant firms . . .has until recently had little to do with eco-
nomic efficiency in the price-output, consumer welfare sense.
The Commission and Court of Justice cases concluding that
refusals to deal were abusive, like the examples set forth in
Article 86 itself, have been based on a concern for fair treat-
ment of distributors (where competitive effects, if any, are to
be found at the secondary level), or, in some cases, upon the
threatened exclusion of direct rivals (where at least colorable
arguments can be advanced to suggest that the refusals in-
crease market power and could therefore impair consumer
welfare). In sum, these cases reflect a mix of concerns more
common to American antitrust of two decades past, and give
Article 86, because it is multi-valued, a highly regulatory qual-
ity Section 2 now lacks. 4
The second element to bear in mind is that the primary
10. M. Waelbroeck, Antitrust Analysis Under Article 85(1) and Article 85(3), in 1987
FoRDHAm CORP. L. INsr. 693, 702 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1988).
11. Commission Decision No. 79/159/EEC, OJ. L 28/19, at 26, 134 (1976) [here-
inafter SABA].
12. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 86.
13. Id.
14. Thomas E. Kauper, Whither Article 86? Observations on Excessive Prices and Refus-
als to Deal, in 1989 FoIDH~m Corn,. L. INST. 651, 668 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990).
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goal of the EC competition policy is to unify the common mar-
ket and to prevent private or public market intervention that is
or could be incompatible with such a common market. For ex-
ample, in the Metro case,' 5 the Court of Justice emphasized that
the objective of the Treaty regarding competition policy was to
ensure "the creation of a single market achieving conditions sim-
ilar to those of a domestic market."' 6 Schr6ter goes even further
when he states that "in the EC competition policy in general and
antitrust policy in particular is primarily 'integration policy'
aimed at bringing about a maximum of economic inter-penetra-
tion and thus merging the separate national markets into a sin-
gle market of the Community."' 7
This means that interventions in the market mechanism,
whether private or public, that establish directly a separation be-
tween national markets, such as an export cartel or a price dis-
crimination across national borders, are prohibited. This also
means that interventions, which establish differences in the eco-
nomic circumstances faced by potential competitors, are viewed
with extreme suspicion to the extent that the competitors af-
fected are located in different countries or that the intervention
could apply to competitors located in different Member States
because they could directly or indirectly limit the extent of eco-
nomic inter-penetration between national markets.
As Barry Hawk noted:
The EC market integration goal results in both stricter rules
and a different method of substantive analysis than under US
law... [T]he market integration goal is not necessarily con-
sistent with other competition policy objectives, notably pro-
motion of efficiency. At the minimum there is tension (and
possible trade-offs) between strict legal rules based on market
integration goal and efficiencies, at least in the short term.' 8
In this case, the integration goal supersedes the efficiency goal as
is suggested by the 1991 report of the Commission on competi-
tion policy, which states:
15. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co. KG v. Commission, Case 26/76, [1977]
E.C.R. 1875, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. 1.
16. Id. at 1904, 1 20, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. at 33.
17. Schr6ter, supra note 7, at 657.
18. Barry Hawk, Un Tour d'Horizon du Droit et de la Politique de Concurrence, SEMMNE
JURMIQUE, Oct. 15, 1992, at 1.
COMPETITION AND STATE AlD POLICY
[C] ompetition policy has been an important Community in-
strument used both to promote economic integration and to
ensure an efficient allocation of resources. Effective compet-
ton is the main stimulus to innovation and higher productiv-
ity which underpins policies designed to increase economic
growth and welfare. Not only does competition lead to
higher output but it also enables consumers to obtain a fair
share of this growth. Living standards therefore depend on
the maintenance of effective competition.'
9
The third important feature of the EC competition law lies
in the fact that if the goal of EC competition law is to facilitate
the emergence of the common market, then the common mar-
ket is not an end in itself. Rather, according to Article 2, the
common market is a means
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and
balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and
non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high
degree of convergence of economic performance, a high
level of employment and of social protection, the raising of
the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and
social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.2 °
To achieve these broad goals, Article 3 of the Treaty states,
among other things, that the activities of the Community shall
include a common policy in the sphere of agriculture and fisher-
ies, in the sphere of transport, in the sphere of the environment,
in the strengthening of economic and social cohesion, in the
strengthening of the competitiveness of Community industry,
and in the promotion of research and technological develop-
ment.
2
'
Two types of trade-offs may thus surface in the application
of EC competition law. First, a trade-off between competition in
the static sense and dynamic competition, and second, a trade-
off between competition and some of the other objectives of the
Treaty. Two principles laid out in the provisions of the Treaty
related to competition among undertakings allow partial consid-
erations of these trade-offs. First, there is an exemption mecha-
nism that gives a certain amount of flexibility in the enforcement
19. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNTIS, XXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
PoucY 11, 13 (1991).
20. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2.
21. Id- art. 3.
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of competition law by allowing some anti-competitive practices
that have redeeming values either from the point of view of com-
petition in the long run or from the point of view of the other
objectives of the Treaty. Second, such exemptions can only be
granted in cases where competition is not eliminated for a sub-
stantial part of the products in question.
There is no exemption in the case of Article 86, because, by
definition, the anti-competitive abuse by a firm holding a domi-
nant position within the common market restricts competition
in a substantial part of the European market. However, practices
of undertakings which fall under Article 85(1) may be exempted
through Article 85(3) if they "contribute[ ] to improving the
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or
economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit;"22 if they do not impose on the undertakings
restrictions that are not indispensable; and if they do not "afford
such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question."23
Typical examples of such exemptions would include special-
ization agreements, research cooperation, or joint ventures
through which two or more undertakings combine their capaci-
ties and knowledge, when the aim of such arrangements is to
improve the efficiency of the firms involved. Additionally, agree-
ments that ensure the existence of a new product or service
would be exempt. Discussing the question of the relationship
between competition law and industrial policy in the European
Community, Manfred Caspari concluded:
[W]hile the competition rules laid down in the EEC Treaty
are applied within the framework of an overall and active
competition policy, considerations which in a broad sense
may be described as industrial policy considerations enter
into a number of decisions. The aim is to create efficient un-
dertakings on markets that fulfill this function, undertakings
which are willing and able to engage in fair and active compe-
24tition. 4
While the three specific features of European competition
22. Id. art. 85(3).
23. Id.
24. Manfred Caspari, 1992-EEC Competition Law and Industrial Polity, in 1989 FoRD-
HAM CoRP. L. INsT. 163, 179 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990).
COMPETITION AND STATE AID POLICY
law outlined above are well known and have been discussed fre-
quently in the analysis of Article 85 and Article 86 decisions, they
are also useful for understanding both the provisions of Article
92, which establish the substantive rules for aids granted by
Member States, and the case law.
In the Chapter devoted to Rules on Competition, the first
paragraph of Section 3 of Article 92, entitled "Aids Granted by
States," provides:
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a
Member State or through State resources in any form whatso-
ever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain
goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member
States, be incompatible with the common market.
25
The second and third paragraphs of Article 92 detail the
exemptions to this rule. Some state aids, including those having
a social character, those that compensate for damages caused by
natural disasters, and those granted to the economy of certain
areas of the Federal Republic of Germany, shall be compatible
with the common market. Others may be considered compati-
ble with the common market. Of particular interest is para-
graph 3 of Article 92, which states:
The following may be considered to be compatible with
the common market:
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas
where the standard of living is abnormally low or
where there is serious underemployment;
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important pro-
ject of common European interest or to remedy a
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member
State;
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic
activities or of certain economic areas, where such
aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an
extent contrary to the common interest... ;
(d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation
where such aid does not affect trading conditions
and competition in the Community to an extent that
is contrary to the common interest; [and]
25. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 92.
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(e) such other categories of aid as may be specified by
decision of the Council acting by a qualified majority
on a proposal from the Commission.26
I. STATE AIDS
Although Article 92 does not define state aids, the defini-
tion of such aids is clear, if wide-ranging. The Court of Justice
has stated:
The concept of aid is... wider than that of a subsidy because
it embraces not only positive benefits, such as subsidies them-
selves, but also interventions which, in various forms, mitigate
the charges which are normally included in the budget of an
undertaking and which, without, therefore, being subsidies in
the strict meaning of the word, are similar in character and
have the same effect.27
Thus, within the scope of Article 92, state aid can take a
variety of forms: subsidies; preferential rates on loans; cash in-
jections to public enterprises; deferrals of tax, social security or
other payments; sale or rental of land or property at discounted
rates; preferential electricity or natural gas rates; infra-structural
projects benefiting identifiable end users; and others.2 In ef-
fect, any intervention by a Member State, i.e., by a state body or
through the direction of the state, which intervention benefits a
firm or a group of firms by increasing the resources they would
normally obtain or by decreasing the costs, including taxes, they
would otherwise incur, qualifies as a state aid irrespective of
whether the benefit is conferred in money or in kind.
The fact that the aid must favor certain undertakings means
that Member State interventions that apply uniformly across the
economy cannot be considered state aids. This does not mean
that general economic measures, such as rules of depreciation
applied to capital equipment or charges on employers and em-
ployees to finance social benefits, cannot distort competition,
but rather, are covered by other provisions in the Treaty.29
26. Id.
27. De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenminen in Limburg v. High Authority of the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community, Case 30/59, [1961] E.C.R. 1, 1.
28. Id.
29. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 101. Article 101 states:
Where the Commission finds that a difference between the provisions laid
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States is distorting
COMPETITION AND STATE AID POLICY
The only real difficulty concerns the case of capital injec-
tions into private or public firms. If the Member State invests in
a manner similar to a private investor, expecting a normal return
on its investment, then there is no state aid. If the Member State
invests where a private investor would not have invested, then
there is a state aid. Thus, when private and public investors in-
ject capital simultaneously and in comparable amounts, it is pre-
sumed that there is no state aid. However, when only the Mem-
ber State injects capital, the Commission evaluates whether a pri-
vate investor would have been likely to invest given the financial
and industrial circumstances of the firm. The hypothetical pri-
vate investor is assumed to seek a normal rate of return given a
reasonable delay.
For example, the Commission's evaluation of a Sicilian re-
gional law concerning in particular the financing of Sitas, a firm
engaged in the hotel business, noted that this firm
is continuing to incur losses despite considerable investment
by the region totalling some Lit 270 billion.... There are no
prospects of a turnaround, as evidenced by the fact that the
management of EMS is seeking to negotiate with the creditor
banks and that liquidation proceedings were commenced but
not completed, chiefly because of a lack of buyers.
No investor operating in a market economy would inject
capital under such circumstances or take on the losses of a
company without a future.30
The Commission concluded that "the sums in question must be
regarded as state aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) in so
far as they allow a firm with no economic basis to remain artifi-
cially in operation."3 '
the conditions of competition in the common market and that the resultant
distortion needs to be eliminated, it shall consult the Member States con-
cerned.
If such consultation does not result in an agreement eliminating the dis-
tortion in question, the Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission,
acting unanimously during the first stage and by a qualified majority thereaf-
ter, issue the necessary directives. The Commission and the Council may take
any other appropriate measures provided for in this Treaty.
Id
30. Commission Decision No. 94/374/EC, O.J. L 170/36, 38-39 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Sitas].
31. Id. at 39.
5331994]
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II. DISTORTION OF COMPETITION AND EFECT ON TRADE
When comparing the first paragraph of Article 92 to the un-
derlying concept of competition in the Treaty, it is clear that all
state aids "distort or threaten to distort competition."3 2 Indeed,
a state aid gives certain firms an advantage not conferred to their
competitors in their own Member State or in other Member
States. In that sense, they are discriminatory and unfair. 3
State aids place competitors of the aided undertakings at a
disadvantage, thereby distorting competition. As the second re-
port on state aids notes:
Not only are enterprises in other Member states put at a com-
petitive disadvantage by the aid because the aided enterprises
are favoured in a way outside the normal fiscal or social secur-
ity systems that contribute to the equilibrium between Mem-
ber States, but also enterprises not receiving aid in the same
Member State are disadvantaged and pay higher taxes di-
rectly or indirectly.34
Thus, state aids are treated as per se anti-competitive.3 5 In line
with this reasoning, the Commission's decision on the financing
of Sitas states that "[t] he aid has the effect of distorting competi-
tion since it improves the economic position of the recipients in
relation to their competitors who do not receive such assist-
ance."
36
The above decision also illustrates one of the disturbing fea-
tures of the Commission's decisions on state aids. In the
landmark Philip Morris case, 7 the Court ofJustice ruled that the
Commission did not have to determine the relevant market on
which competition is supposed to be distorted before establish-
ing that an aid distorted competition, as in Article 85 or Article
86 cases.3 8
An extreme case, which illustrates the dogmatic position of
32. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 92.
33. Id.
34. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SECOND SURVEY ON STATE AIDS IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE MANUFACrURING AND CERTAIN OTHER SECTORS 7
(1990).
35. Id.
36. Sitas, OJ. L 170/36, at 40 (1994).
37. Philip Morris Holland B.V. v. Commission, Case 730/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2671,
[1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 321.
38. Id. at 2676, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. at 339.
COMPETITION AND STATE AD POLTCY
the Commission on the relationship between state aid and com-
petition, is the Commission decision on the proposal to award
aid to SST-Garngesellschaft mbH, Thfiringen.s9 According to
the Commission, the object of this aid was to cover the cost of
the installation of new facilities for the production of polyester
staple fiber. The entire output of the new plant was to serve as
supply for the company's spinning mill for the production of
specialized polyester yarn, which is not produced elsewhere in
the Community.40 The Commission then went on to state:
The aid in question undoubtedly constitutes aid within the
meaning of Article 92(1) of the EC Treaty, as it would allow
SST-Gamgesellschaft mbH to carry out the planned invest-
ment without having to bear all of the cost. Furthermore, as
there is intra-Community trade in polyester staple .... the
proposed aid would be likely to distort competition and affect
trade among the Member States.4 '
The decision leaves us in the dark as to how the aid would distort
competition because the beneficiary of the state aid will be the
sole producer in the Community of the specialized yam it in-
tends to manufacture. The only conceivable cases in which
there could be a distortion of competition would be either if the
polyester yarn, which the beneficiary planned to produce, was a
substitute for some of the other polyester staple produced in the
Community, or if there were imports of this yarn. Yet, the Com-
mission indicated that the yarn is specialized, which seems to
suggest that it does not have substitutes, and did not mention
the existence of imports. Thus, it appears that even when there
are no competitors, state aids can be considered to distort com-
petition. In short, there is a clear possibility of conflicts between
the interpretation of the concept of competition in Article 85
and Article 86 cases and in state aids cases.
Finally, a state aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) must
"affect[ ] trade between the Member States."42 One should note
that the Commission and the Court ofJustice have given a broad
interpretation of the concept of effect on trade in decisions on
state aids, in line with the interpretation of this concept in Arti-
39. Commission Decision No. 94/266/EC, OJ. L 114/21 (1994) [hereinafter SST-
Garngesellschaft mbH, Thfiringen].
40. Id. at 21.
41. Id. at 23.
42. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 92(1).
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cle 85 and Article 86 decisions. The Commission and the Court
of Justice consider, for example, that even when state aids are
not specifically designed to stimulate exports or restrain imports,
they nevertheless affect trade if they reinforce the position of an
undertaking vis-d-vis competitors in intra-Community, trade.43
When the beneficiary of the state aid exports part of its produc-
tion, this condition is fulfilled, even if the exports represent a
small part, less than 5%, of its total production,' or if its exports
represent a tiny part, less than 0.03%, of intra-EC trade.45
In addition, to appraise the effect of Community trade the
Commission not only takes into account the potential advantage
that the beneficiary will enjoy on exports markets, it also consid-
ers the advantage it may derive from the state aid on its domestic
market vis-d-vis foreign importers.
For example, in its decision concerning the financing of
Sitas, the Commission stated:
The measures to be regarded as constituting state aid consti-
tute assistance to firms operating in Sicily. They benefit those
firms inasmuch as the assistance is not provided outside the
region.... The aid in question .. . affects trade between
Member States. Although it is not possible to assess the full
impact of the aid as not all the recipients are known, import
and export statistics . . . reveal that a significant proportion
of Sicilian products and services is exported to other Member
States. In addition, trade between Member States is also af-
fected in cases where the aid favours domestic output and
services to the detriment of imports and the provision of serv-
ices from other Member States.46
What is remarkable in this and other decisions is that the Com-
mission relies Only on the fact that there is intra-Community
trade in the sector in which the beneficiaries of the aid operate
to establish that the aid affects trade between Member States.
Furthermore, even in cases in which the state aid is granted
43. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 84/496/EEC, O.J. L 276/34 (1984) [herein-
after Tournai] (whenever financial aid granted by Member State strengthens position
of undertaking relative to other firms competing with it in intra-Community trade, lat-
ter must be considered affected by aid).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 88/174/EEC, O.J. L 79/29 (1988) (con-
cerning aid that Land of Baden-Wfirttemberg of Federal Republic of Germany provided
to BUG-Alutechnik GmbH, undertaking producing semi-finished aluminum products).
46. Sitas, O.J. L 170/37, at 40 (1994).
COMPETITION AND STATE AID POLICY
to a firm or a group of firms selling a product for which there is
practically no intra-Community trade, the Commission may con-
sider that trade is affected if this aid is likely to limit the develop-
ment of a competing product for which there are significant ex-
ports and imports.47
Thus, state aid of any significance is automatically deemed
to meet the other criteria of paragraph 1 of Article 92 and to be
incompatible with the common market. The Commission does
not have to elaborate at length over why in the particular case at
hand the aid could distort competition, what the market and the
affected products are, or whether these particular products as
opposed to other products in the same sector are traded among
Member States. The Commission, however, considers that Arti-
cle 92(1) does not apply to state aids grants amounting to less
than 50,000 ECU over a three-year period.
48
III. EXEMPTIONS
The main question in state aids decisions, therefore, is
whether the aid qualifies for an exemption or, in other words,
whether the state aid fulfills some other goal of the Treaty.
There are two types of automatic exemptions: Article 92(2) ex-
emptions and various types of discretionary, Article 92(3) ex-
emptions. The two types of automatic exemptions are: first,
state aids that have a social character, are granted to individual
consumers, and are granted without discrimination regarding
the origin of the product;49 and second, state aids that are due to
exceptional circumstances requiring solidarity, i.e., aids to com-
pensate for the damage caused by national disasters or excep-
tional occurrences.50
Other aids may be exempted. Among these are aids to pro-
mote the economic development of severely depressed areas,
i.e., areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or
47. See, e.g., Commission Regulation No. 1471/72,J.O. L 156/15 (1972).
48. See, e.g., Community Guidelines on State Aid for Small and Medium-Sized En-
terprises (SMEs), OJ. C 213/2, at 5 (1992) [hereinafter Guidelines for SMEs] (estab-
lishing de minimis figure while discussing Article 93(3) notification requirements).
49. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 92(2) (a).
50. Id. Until 1990, state aids granted to the economy of certain areas of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany affected by the division of Germany were also automatically
exempted. HANCHER Er AL., EC STATE AIDS 55-57 (1993).
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where there is serious unemployment.51 Also included are aids
to promote the execution of important projects of common Eu-
ropean interest.5 2
Article 92(3) (a) is designed to exempt state aids that com-
pensate for handicaps that would normally deter firms from in-
vesting in more backward regions, in which the per capita gross
domestic product does not exceed seventy-five percent of the
Community average in purchasing power parities. 53 As Manfred
Caspari stated, "[sluch aid is therefore an expression of efforts
to create greater equality of opportunity between regions. It is
in line with the cohesion requirement... incorporated into the
EEC Treaty." 4 The granting of an exemption on the basis of
Article 92(3) (a) is, however, subject to two conditions. First, the
aid must concern one of the regions from a Commission list,
which includes the whole of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, the Ital-
ian Mezzogiorno, Northern Ireland, various provinces of Spain,
and the overseas departments of France.55 Second, the aid must
not lead to the creation of competition-distorting excess capacity
in capital intensive industries.56
State aids to other regions may be exempted, however,
under the provisions of Article 92(3) (c). As far as Article
92(3) (b) is concerned, there are very few cases of "important
project[s] of common European interest" justifying an exemp-
tion." Those projects are usually associated with programs such
as ESPRIT,5 RACE,5 9 or BRITE60 or with situations in which the
Community is confronted by a general threat such as the de-
struction of the environment. The Commission stated in its
1991 annual report that Article 92(3) (b) could also apply to
51. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 92(3)(a).
52. Id. art. 92(3)(b).
53. Id. art. 92(3) (a).
54. Caspari, supra note 24, at 173.
55. Commission Communication, OJ. C 212/2, at 6-7 (1988) (on method for ap-
plication of Article 92(3) (a) and (c) to regional aid).
56. Id.
57. Commission Decision No. 94/118/EC, O.J. L 54/30, at 37 (1994) [hereinafter
Aer lingus].
58. ESPRIT is an acronym for European Strategy Program for Research in Infor-
mation Technologies.
59. RACE is an acronym for Research and Development in Advanced Communica-
tion Technologies for Europe.
60. BRITE is an acronym for Basic Research in Industrial Technologies for Eu-
rope.
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projects that were important both quantitatively and qualita-
tively, transnational, and related to the definition of interna-
tional standards, thus allowing European industry to benefit
from the full advantages of a single market.6' For example, the
Commission considered that state aids granted by the govern-
ments of France, the Netherlands, and Italy designed to en-
courage research and development for the 'definition of a Euro-
pean standard for High Definition Television could be ex-
empted. 62 If the aid examined relates to an important project of
common European interest, the Commission also verifies that it
does not exceed what is tolerable from a competition policy
point of view.
One reason for the Commission's narrow interpretation of
Articles 92(3) (a) and 92(3) (b) is that the these provisions do
not explicitly condition the granting of the exemption on
whether the aid will not significantly affect intra-European trade.
In the vast majority of cases, the discussion about the possibility
of an exemption is based upon Article 92 (3) (c), which concerns
aids that "facilitate the development of certain economic activi-
ties or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not ad-
versely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the
common interest."
63
It is not easy to summarize the principles underlying the
Commission's reasoning when it applies Article 92 (3) (c). Con-
currently, one niust consider: the wording of Article 92 (3) (c);
general principles imbedded in other articles of the Treaty; a
variety of specific rules established by the Commission in guide-
lines or frameworks on state aids that are either horizontal, such
as the guidelines dealing with regional aids, aids for research
and development, aids for the restructuring of firms, aids for
small and medium-sized enterprises, and aids for the environ-
ment, or sectoral, such as aids for textile and clothing, synthetic
fibers, motor vehicles, shipbuilding, coal and steel, agriculture,
and food processing; and the case law.
The Commission has enjoyed considerable discretion in in-
terpreting Article 92(3) (c). This situation, however, may change
61. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVTH GENERAL REPORT OF THE
AcrrVmEs OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1991).
62. Commission Regulation No. 3029/93, O.J. L 271/1 (1993).
63. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 92(3) (c).
1994]
540 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:525
in the future. Leigh Hancher, Tom Ottervanger, and Piet Jan
Slot stated that:
Up until now the Court has generally been prepared to en-
dorse the Commission's discretionary powers to assess the
compatibility of individual measures with Article 92(1) as be-
ing wide in nature. In only two cases to date has the Court
annulled a Commission Decision on grounds of a manifest
error of fact. Our survey of the Commission's decision mak-
ing practice suggests that, in certain cases,' the factual evi-
dence presented in support of a decision to allow a national
aid to be granted could well bear closer scrutiny. Once again
parallels may be drawn from the experience gained in the
application of Articles 85 and 86. One of the reasons for
transferring jurisdiction in appeals against Commission deci-
sions concerning these Articles to the Court of First Instance
was to improve the administration of justice in the Commu-
nity by engaging in more detailed investigation of factual mat-
ters. That Court has now developed a particular expertise in
dealing with the economic effects of complex factual issues.
.... The transfer of jurisdiction [to the Tribunal, effective
August 1993] to review individual challenges to state aid deci-
sions may be one means of stimulating a more critical ap-
praisal of Commission state aid policy.64
A necessary, but not sufficient,. condition for a state aid to
be granted an exemption under Article 92 (3) (c) is that it be in
the common interest of the Community. This eoncept is not de-
fined in Article 92. Furthermore, the goals of the Community
listed in Article 2 of the Treaty are couched in terms so general
that the Commission has a sufficient flexibility to decide what
interferences in market mechanisms should be legitimized
through state aids and to set Community industrial policy
agenda.
Before analyzing the criteria used by the Commission to de-
termine what is in the common interest, it should be stressed
that the compatibility with the Treaty must be determined in the
context of the Community as a whole and not in the context of a
single Member State. This has several implications. The first
one is to legitimize the fact that Member States are not compe-
tent to apply directly the provisions of the Treaty relating to state
aids. Second, it means that Member States cannot justify the
64. HANCHER ET AL., supra note 50, at 15.
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granting of state aids solely on the basis of the benefits they ex-
pect from such aids. For example, a state aid designed to foster
economic development in a depressed region in one Member
State may not be in the interest of the Community if the region
cannot be considered to be economically depressed when com-
pared to all regions in the Community. Thus, in its Tenth Re-
port on Competition Policy, the Commission stated:
State aids are in principle incompatible with the common
market. The discretionary powers of the Commission should
only be exercised when the aids proposed by Member States
contribute to the achievement of the Community objectives
and interest set out in Article 92 (3). The national interest of
a Member State or the benefits obtained by the recipient of
the aid in contributing to the national interest do not by
themselves justify the positive exercise of the Commission's
discretionary powers.
6 5
Third, it also means that the Commission has reservations about
state aids granted to multinational firms. Indeed, because mul-
tinational firms often operate on a global level, state aids
designed to help them restructure are not necessarily consistent
with what would be in the interest of the Community.
At the most general level, one can say that the Commission
views four types of aids favorably: aids for small and medium-
sized enterprises, aids for regional development, aids for re-
search and development, and aids for the environment.
Regarding aids for small and medium-sized enterprises, the
Community Guidelines on State Aid for Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises states that: "there can be no doubt that state
aids for [small and medium-sized enterprises] 'facilitate the de-
velopment of certain economic activities or of certain economic
areas.' "66 At the same time, the Commission considers that aids
to small and medium-sized enterprises are less disruptive of com-
petition than aids to larger firms.
State aids for research and development may also be viewed
positively to the extent that they relate to the aim stated in Arti-
cle 130f(1) of the Treaty, which strengthens "the scientific and
technological bases of Community industry and [which encour-
65. COMMISSION OF THE EuRoPEAM COMMUNITIES, TENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
PoLIcy 160 (1983).
66. Guidelines for SMEs, supra note 48, OJ. C 213/2, at 5 (1992).
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ages] it to become more competitive at international level."67 As
the guidelines on research and development make clear, the
Commission views favorably state aids for basic industrial re-
search, but limits the state aid to fifty percent of the gross cost of
the project or program. The Commission feels, however, that if
the research and development is more thoroughly applied so
that its output more easily and rapidly influences a product mar-
ket, then there is a greater risk that the state aid will distort com-
petition. Therefore, the ceiling on the admissible state aid de-
creases as the research is increasingly applied. The Commission
also considers that simple improvement of existing facilities does
not qualify for an exemption under Article 92(3) (c). 68 To qual-
ify for an exemption under Article 92(3) (c), the investment ben-
efiting from the state aid must lead to the development of new
products or the adoption of new processes.
State aids for regional development, when applied to re-
gions that suffer from serious socio-economic disparities with the
rest of the Community, are viewed favorably and monitored by
the Commission to achieve the goals of promoting a "harmoni-
ous and balanced development of economic activities" 9 and
"convergence of economic performance"7" as set out in Article 2
of the Treaty. Thus, for example, state aids to investments in
central, industrialized regions, cannot exceed 20% of the total
investment, whereas in peripheral, lowly industrialized regions,
they can represent a larger proportion of the investment.
Finally, environmental aids, which also relate to the goal of
achieving "growth respecting the environment," set out in Arti-
cle 2 of the Treaty, are viewed favorably if they are necessary to
help undertakings adapt to laws or regulations, which impose
major new burdens relating to environmental protection. In this
instance, an undertaking can get an Article 92 (3) (b) exemption.
If the aid is intended to promote additional efforts going beyond
national standards, then the undertaking may qualify for an Arti-
cle 92(3) (c) exemption.
In sectors facing serious economic difficulties due to inter-
national competition, such as motor vehicles, textiles, shipbuild-
67. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 130f(1).
68. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 87/16/EEC, O.J. L 12/27 (1987) (denying
Italian government's proposal to improve chemical industry facilities).
69. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2.
70. Id.
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ing, coal and steel, and where Member States may have a natural
and growing inclination to grant state aids, the Commission has
been concerned with limiting such aids. The aid is limited to
projects that improve the efficiency of the industry, allow the
conversion of firms to activities outside the industry, or allow ex-
isting firms to diversify their production towards products that
will place them in a better position on the international markets.
Such aids are allowed, however, only to the extent that they will
not worsen the difficulties of similar industries in other Euro-
pean countries.
In other sectors, state aids may be allowed if they appear
necessary to the development or maintenance of existing strate-
gic industries. Thus, for example, the Commission allowed a
state aid by the United Kingdom for the restructuring of the last
tin mine in Europe. It also allowed a state aid by the United
Kingdom for the purchase of industrial equipment for off-shore
exploration when this sector was in an early stage of develop-
ment in Europe. In 1979, however, the Commission withheld
approval of the state aid because by then the sector had devel-
oped, and the promotion of this sector no longer had strategic
importance. Similarly, the Commission may allow state aids to
shipyards for the construction of ships so that they can success-
fully compete against non-European shipyards. However, in
such cases the state aid must not exceed the amount necessary to
prevent the order from going to a non-European shipyard.
To qualify for the exemptions of Article 92 (3) (c), aids that
fit the above mentioned general criteria must also meet at least
six conditions: they must be transparent; they must be justified
by a market failure or an externality; they must not provide con-
tinuous artificial support to non-viable undertakings; they must
not create over-capacities; they must be proportionate to the
goal they seek to achieve; and the restrictions to competition
and trade that they entail must not outweigh the expected bene-
fits at the Community level.
The transparency requirement is the easiest to understand.
To grant an exemption, the Commission must be in a position to
know precisely, both quantitatively and qualitatively, what the aid
is all about. In particular, the Commission needs to know who
the beneficiaries are, what the mechanism of the aid is, what the
goal of the aid is, and what the importance of the aid is, both in
absolute terms and in proportion to the total investment.
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The second condition is more substantive. Exemptions may
be invoked only when the Commission is satisfied that without
the aid, market forces alone would be insufficient to guide the
recipients towards the behavior that the state aid is supposed to
encourage and that must be consistent with the other condi-
tions. Thus, on the one hand, the Commission may grant an
Article 92(3) (c) exemption for regional aids in certain lagging
areas, such as those in which the GDP per inhabitant is in the
long run at least fifteen percent lower than the national average,
or where the unemployment rate is at least ten percent greater
than the national unemployment rate. The Commission must
be convinced that without such aids, these areas would not be
able to attract sufficient private investment to reduce their defi-
cit. Alternatively, the Commission will refuse to grant an exemp-
tion for a state aid to a firm if it is convinced that the proposed
investment would be profitable without the aid. The Commis-
sion will deny the exemption even if the investment can be con-
sidered to have a Community interest, i.e., if it contributes to the
development of the firm's region or sector.7'
State aids designed simply to facilitate the modernization of
existing capacities of an unprofitable firm in a sector character-
ized by existing or potential excess capacity will not be granted
an exemption on the basis of Article 92(3) (c) for various rea-
sons. First, the modernization of a firm is, in itself, considered
by the Commission to be part of what profit maximizing private
investors would normally do, and therefore unrelated to a mar-
ket failure or an externality. Second, the expansion of capacities
or the modernization of a firm in a structurally depressed sector
is not likely to alleviate the disequilibrium between supply and
demand at the Community level, as would a decrease in capacity
or a restructuring of the firm allowing it to redirect some or all
of its resources to another sector or to a different market. The
profitability of the beneficiary would likely improve from such
aids. The burden between supply and demand associated with
the structural disequilibrium at the Community level, however,
would shift to competing firms of other Member States. Thus,
allowing a Member State to grant such aids would eventually give
an incentive to other Member States to retaliate by granting aids
71. See, e.g., Tournai, OJ. L 276/34 (1984).
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for the modernization of their firms. Consequently, this succes-
sion of aid would not restore the profitability of the sector.
The third condition is that state aids must not provide artifi-
cial support to unprofitable undertakings. The Commission has
repeatedly stated that state aids should not be used to prevent
the disappearance of non-viable firms. For example, the Com-
mission, in its decision concerning financing for Sitas, stated:
With regard to the exceptions provided for in Article
92 (3) (c) in respect of aid to facilitate the development of cer-
tain economic activities where such aid does not adversely af-
fect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common
interest, the aid is not tied to any restructuring plan ensuring
restoration of the firm's viability. It is therefore an operating
aid which preserves the status quo by preventing normal mar-
ket forces from taking effect. The aid cannot, therefore, be
considered compatible with the common market.72
Fourth, the Commission considers that state aids in sectors
characterized by existing or potential excess capacities can be
tolerated if, and only if, they contribute to a restructuring of the
beneficiaries and a decrease of existing capacities, over and be-
yond the reductions that would be spontaneously forced on the
beneficiaries by the normal working of the market. It must be
clear that the restructuring will enable the firm to become prof-
itable without further injection of state aid.
This principle is embedded in various sectoral guidelines or
codes. For example, investment aids in the steel sector, charac-
terized by severe excess capacity, cannot, in general, qualify for
an exemption under Article 92(3) (c). There is a temporary ex-
emption for Greece, Portugal, and the German landers located
in the former German Democratic Republic. To qualify for this
exemption, capacity reductions must accompany the aids. Simi-
larly, in the synthetic fiber industry, aids for investments relating
to the production and texturization of polyester, polyamide,
acrylic, and polypropylene fibers can qualify for an exemption
only if they are combined with a capacity reduction of the bene-
ficiary. In the automobile sector state aids for unprofitable man-
ufacturers of passenger vehicles must, among other require-
ments, include a restructuring plan and a reduction in capacity
for the beneficiary. Beyond the requirements set in certain
72. Sitas, OJ. L 170/36, at 41 (1994).
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sectoral regulations on state aids, other regulations on aids, for
rescue aids, or for environmental investments, specify that such
aids must be accompanied by reductions of capacity of the bene-
ficiary.
The general concern of the Commission with overcapacity
raises several questions. If interpreted strictly, it implies that a
new entrant in the sectors or in the markets considered to be
having overcapacity cannot benefit from a state aid, because by
definition it cannot reduce its existing capacity, whereas estab-
lished firms could benefit from such an aid in certain circum-
stances, i.e., if they met the other conditions set by the Commis-
sion.
The SST-Garngesellschaft mbH decision7" illustrates this
consideration. The object of this aid was to cover the cost of the
installation of new facilities for the production of polyester sta-
ple fiber. The entire output of the new plant was to supply the
company's spinning mill for the production of specialized poly-
ester yarn that is not produced elsewhere in the Community.
Having found that this aid violated Article 92(1), the Commis-
sion stated:
Since 1977, aid to the synthetic fibre industry has been sub-
ject to constraints. The current version of the Code relates to
the production and texturization of four fibers - polyester,
polyamide, acrylic and polypropylene - irrespective of the
end-use, and to their polymerization where integrated with
fibre production in terms of the machinery involved. The
Code states clearly that authorization of proposals to grant
aid to synthetic fibre producers is conditional on a significant
reduction in the production capacity of the prospective bene-
ficiary. SST itself does not currently produce any synthetic
fibers so that a capacity reduction is not possible. The aid
does not meet the requirements of the Code.7 4
Perhaps because it sensed that this reasoning led to an eco-
nomically questionable result in the case at hand, the Commis-
sion found a way to authorize it. Despite the fact that the region
did not meet the code requirements, the Commission granted
the aid because the region could be classified for regional aid by
virtue of Article 92(3) (a), and because the investment consid-
73. SST-Garngesellschaft mbH, Thfiringen, O.J. L 114/21 (1994).
74. Id. at 23.
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ered was part of a broader plan to restructure the German Dem-
ocratic Republic's synthetic fiber industry. The Commission
stated that granting the aid would result in a reduction in capac-
ity of twenty-five percent, similar to the reduction in capacity in
the rest of the Community since 1978.
The tougher standards used by the Commission to exempt a
state aid when there is actual or potential "excess capacity" in the
sector, together with the Commission's discretion as to the defi-
nition of the market or sector examined, can also lead to striking
differences in the standards applied by the Commission in its
decisions. 7
In this respect, it is interesting to compare two decisions:
the Commission decision on a state aid granted to Opel for an
investment in one of the landers of the former German Demo-
cratic Republic, 76 and its decision on the state aid granted to
Ford and Volkswagen by the Portuguese government for the cre-
ation of a new plant in the Setubal peninsula.77 In both cases,
the aid was for an investment in an automobile plant in an eco-
nomically depressed area. In the first case, the Commission did
not go into details about market segmentation and found that
there was overcapacity in the automobile industry. Although it
recognized that Opel/GM needed to increase its capacity be-
cause it fully utilized its existing capacity, the Commission con-
cluded that the aided investment would increase overcapacity in
the sector. In the second case, when it considered the aid
granted for the creation by Ford and Volkswagen of a manufac-
turing plant of monospace cars in Portugal, the Commission
considered that there was a separate market for monospace pas-
sengers cars. In a related Article 85 decision, the Commission
acknowledged the fact that there was some degree of sub-
stitutability between monospace cars and other passenger cars,
and that there was no overcapacity for this type of cars.7'
In the first case, the Commission required that the aid be
75. Id. at 24.
76. Commission Notice No. 93/C 43/03, O.J. C 43/14 (1993) (regarding German
Government proposal to award state aid to Opel Group in support of its investment
plans in new lander).
77. Commission Decision Summary No. 91/C 257/04, OJ. C 257/5 (1991) (rais-
ing no objections to aid that Portuguese Government planned to grant to joint-venture
of Ford and Volkswagen to establish multi-purpose vehicle plant in Setubal peninsula).
78. Commission Decision No. 93/49/EEC, OJ. L 20/14 (1993) (Ford/Volk-
swagen).
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limited to the amount or the intensity strictly necessary to com-
pensate for the extra costs incurred by Opel/GM due to the lo-
cation of its investment. This decision concluded that the aid
would create overcapacity, which is far from obvious because
Opel needed to increase its capacity, and therefore, would prob-
ably have gone ahead with the investment even if the Commis-
sion had decided to prohibit the aid, although possibly in a less
economically depressed area. In the second case, the Commis-
sion used a somewhat arbitrary definition of the market to find
that the aid would not create overcapacity. The Commission,
adopting a more lenient approach, stated that the aid, which
covered the extra cost faced by the investors due to the location
of their investment and an additional financial incentive to at-
tract investments in the region, could be exempted.
The concept of overcapacity, as used by the Commission, is
not always economically relevant. For example, the Commission
frequently refers to the need to increase the rate of utilization of
existing capacities to make European industry more competitive
and uses capacity utilization ratios to determine whether or not
excess capacity has increased or decreased in a particular sector.
Capacity utilization is calculated by the ratio of actual sales by
the European manufacturers to their total capacity. Over-
capacity is calculated by the ratio of total European demand for
a product at a competitive price, whether this demand was met
by domestic producers or importers, to total capacity by Euro-
pean manufacturers. Except under strong assumptions, for ex-
ample, no imports and perfect competition among the Euro-
pean manufacturers, these two ratios are unrelated. Indeed the
value of capacity utilization ratios, as opposed to excess capacity
ratios, is heavily dependent on the market strategy of the manu-
facturers.
Reliance on the rate of capacity utilization, to assess the pro-
priety of a state aid, can be extremely misleading from the point
of view of what an outside observer could consider to be sound
economic reasoning. If total capacity is equal to total demand,
in which case there is no excess capacity, but forty percent of the
demand is satisfied by more efficient non-European importers,
who have developed a new technology not present in Europe,
then capacity utilization in the industry will be only sixty percent.
It is likely that price competition from the efficient non-Euro-
pean competitors will force the market price below the cost of
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the non-efficient domestic producers, so that they will incur
losses. The requirement that a state aid for an investment, such
as one designed to introduce a technological innovation in the
production process, to improve the efficiency of the sector, be
accompanied by a reduction in the production capacity of the
beneficiary clearly favors the importers because it reduces the
scope of competition from the new efficient European manufac-
turer.
Even in cases where there are no significant non-European
imports, the concern of the Commission with excess capacity can
lead to questionable results from the point of view of competi-
tion. If, for example, the excess capacity, as measured by the
Commission, is due to weak competition, the requirement that
the state aid, designed to encourage the introduction of a tech-
nological innovation, be accompanied by a reduction in the ca-
pacity of the beneficiary may unnecessarily slow down the adjust-
ment of the sector and stifle competition.
In the decisions of the Commission on state aids, competi-
tion in the relevant sector is always, implicitly, assumed to be
working satisfactorily, or to be excessive, even though there is
practically no analysis of the actual intensity of competition.
Therefore, the creation of excess capacity through state aids to
investments is never considered by the Commission to enhance
competition; it is only considered to distort fair competition.
However, there is a growing body of economic literature on the
impact of excess capacity and the distribution of such excess ca-
pacity among firms, as well as competition in oligopolies. This
literature suggests, among other things, that an asymmetrical dis-
tribution of excess capacity may, in certain cases, enhance com-
petition. Thus, it is possible that some state aids to investment
may have the dual effect of distorting fair competition and con-
tributing to the creation of excess capacity, thereby increasing
competition in the marketplace.
The final condition set by the Commission for granting an
exemption to a state aid is that it must be proportionate to the
problem that it is designed to resolve. This will keep distortion
to competition at a minimum and will not affect trading to an
extent contrary to the common market.
Whenever the Commission considers state aid for which
one of the sectoral or horizontal Codes applies, it verifies that
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the aid falls within the limit set in the relevant Code. For exam-
ple, in the case of state aids for research and development, state
aids cannot cover more than fifty percent of the gross cost of a
project for basic industrial research or twenty-five percent of the
cost of a project for applied research and development. Simi-
larly, to benefit from an exemption under Article 92(3) (c), re-
gional aids designed to facilitate the development of certain eco-
nomic areas cannot amount to more than thirty percent of the
investment. Under the Code for state aids to shipbuilding, oper-
ating aids for the production of large vessels must be below nine
percent of the cost of the vessel, whereas for vessels costing less
than ten million ECU, the maximum level of state aid is 4.5%.
The maximum levels of state aids for small and medium-sized
firms are usually larger than the maximum for larger firms.
In order to benefit from the exemption of Article 92 (3) (c),
however, the state aid must also be strictly necessary to correct
the problem that justifies the exemption. An example is the
Commission's decision concerning aid to be provided by the
Irish government for the restructuring of the Aer Lingus group,
which was facing a serious financial crisis.79 The Commission
first stated that "the genuine restructuring of Aer Lingus contrib-
utes to the development of the air transport sector from a Com-
munity standpoint."80 It then asked itself whether the amount of
the aid was "adequate and proportionate to the aim of financing
the transition and restore the airline's commercial viability."81
In assessing that the aid was indeed adequate and proportionate,
the Commission took into account the fact that "the equity in-
jected into Aer lingus will not [lead] to an overcapitalization of
the airline but will simply bring its financial ratios into more pru-
dent limits, and, therefore, restore the financial balance."82
"The strategy pursued by Aer Lingus in its restructuring plan is
not over-expansionist" because it will not expand its operating
fleet or change the general pattern of its operations, and conse-
quently, does not aim at increasing its market share.8 3
Finally, the state aid must not adversely "affect[ ] trading
79. Aer Lingus, OJ. L 54/30 (1994).
80. Id. at 38.
81. Id. at 39.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest." 4 The
Commission does not always make its reasoning explicit, but
rather uses its discretionary power to decide whether or not this
condition is met or to impose constraints on the granting of the
aid so that the condition is met. To establish the extent to which
the state aid will affect trading conditions, the Commission takes
into consideration a variety of factors, such as whether: the
amount of the aid is small when compared to the size of the
investment, the market shares of the firms involved are minimal
or will decrease, the market is rapidly expanding, there is little
intra-Community trade for the product involved, or that the in-
vestment will be devoted to the production of goods that will be
sold outside the Community.
In its decision on the aid granted by the United Kingdom to
SCA Aylesford, 5 a manufacturer of newsprint, the Commission
concluded that the investment aid did not adversely affect "trad-
ing conditions.., to an extent contrary to the common inter-
est." 8  The Commission considered that the investment aid
would result in an increase in the capacity of production of the
firm and that part of the increased production, 100,000 tons or
about a third of the increase in capacity, would be sold in other
Member States. Nonetheless, the Commission determined that
the aid was limited and that although the United Kingdom im-
ported seventy-five percent of its consumption of newsprint,
ninety percent of these imports came from non-Community
87countries.
Similarly, in its decision on a state aid from the German gov-
ernment for the restructuring of Carl Zeiss Jena, Jenoptik, and
Jenaer Glaswerk, manufacturers of optical instruments located in
the former German Democratic Republic, the Commission con-
sidered that the very small scale of the activities of the three
firms in the forthcoming years ensured that the aid would not
adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the
common interest.88
84. Id.
85. Commission Notice, O.J. C 46/5 (1993) (aid to SCA Aylesford, manufacturer
of newsprint).
86. 1&, OJ. C 46/5, at 7 (1993).
87. Id., Oj. C 46/5, at 6 (1993).
88. Commission Notice, O.j. C 97/7 (1993) (concerning aid awarded by German
Government to Carl Zeiss Jena, Jenoptik, and Jenaer Glaswerk).
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The Commission decisions, however, do not provide clear
criteria to assess the extent beyond which the effect of trading
cotiditions due to the state aid will be held to be contrary to the
common interest.
CONCLUSION
Manfred Caspari, speaking at the 1989 Fordham Corporate
Law Institute conference, remarked that usually lawyers do not
take much interest in the subject of state aids. This, in his opin-
ion, was wrong because "[s] tate subsidies can distort competition
more, and can create more harm to competing companies which
do not get such support than anti-competitive behavior caught
by antitrust rules." 9
The fact is that this apparent lack of interest for the Euro-
pean state aid policy is not unique to lawyers. Economists, even
those specialized in market mechanisms and competition, have
also been largely silent on the issue. This is all the more perplex-
ing because there are hundreds of decisions by the Commission
each year that concern state aids. However, this state of affairs
could be explained on the ground that even if the provisions on
state aids are part of the rules of competition in the Treaty and
even if the Commission produces decisions on state aids as it
does when it applies Articles 85 and 86, these two sets of deci-
sions have little in common.
First, as any sizeable aid is considered to threaten or distort
competition, market competition or fair competition, there is no
real discussion in the decisions of the actual consequences of the
aids on the relevant markets or detailed definition of the af-
fected markets. The focus of the decisions on state aids is there-
fore very different from the focus of Article 85 or 86 decisions in
which the reasoning used by the Commission to establish that a
particular behavior has restrained competition or to assess the
extent to which competition has been affected is explicit and can
be challenged.
Second, the formal decisions on state aids mostly deal with
the possibility of exemptions for the aids concerned or, in other
words, with the potential contribution of these aids to the com-
mon interest, the development of certain areas or certain eco-
89. Caspari, supra note 24, at 172.
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nomic activities, etc. The assessment of the contribution of state
aids to the promotion of such general and sometimes contradic-
tory goals is, to a large extent, dependent on the policy objec-
tives of the Commission. The Commission has enjoyed broad
discretion in making such assessments. In many cases, its deci-
sions do not prove that an aid can or cannot be exempted, but
merely state that they do or do not adversely affect trading con-
ditions to an extent contrary to the common interest on the ba-
sis of criteria that are not explicit and the validity of which could
not be challenged until recently.
Third, over time, the Commission has defined minimal
rules in various sectoral or horizontal codes. This effort would
certainly be welcome if it contributed to making the decision
mechanism more transparent and more predictable. However,
not only do the definitions of the rules seem somewhat arbitrary,
they constitute a maze rather than an organized body of refer-
ences. In many cases in which several sets of rules could be ap-
plied simultaneously to the same aid with different results, the
Commission will choose the one that fits the conclusion it wants
to reach.
Thus, one could argue that the relative lack of interest of
both lawyers and economists for state aid decisions comes partly
from the fact that they do not always appear to be grounded on a
predictable economic analysis and that the scope for challenging
them is at best limited. Two features that differentiate them
from decisions based on Articles 85 and 86.
Echoing these concerns, the authors of the most compre-
hensive review of EC state aid decisions to date state that
[n]o one could, for a moment, assume that in an area as
highly charged by political and social considerations as state
aids policy that one could expect the Commission to apply a
rigid, formalistic or mechanistic approach to controlling na-
tional state aids. The Treaty itself confers considerable scope
upon it to take into account a wide range of factors in reach-
ing its final Decisions. It is, therefore, not so surprising that
what appears to be an essentially similar set of facts is capable
of yielding quite divergent Decisions in different cases. Yet
one is surely entitled to expect some consistency of approach,
and at the very least that similar emphasis is given to various
factors. One might also expect that especially where guide-
lines exist these should be applied, and be seen to be applied,
1994]
554 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNVAL
in a consistent manner.... On the basis of the analysis of
Commission Decisions undertaken in the preparation of this
study, it cannot be said with any certainty that expectations as
to a consistent approach have been or are always likely to be
met. The relative lack of institutional constraints on the
Commission in this field gives the latter ample scope to draft
Decisions in such a way that factual elements which might
suggest inconsistency are simply ignored or are only referred
to in summary fashion.90
It remains to be seen whether the transfer ofjurisdiction in
appeals against the Commission decisions on state aid to the
Court of First Instance will help bring about a more transparent
and more predictable decision-making process.
90. HANCHER ET AL., supra note 50, at 10-11.
